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STATEMENT OF INTEREST1 
 
The first question herein is whether the federal courts may 
                                                 
1
 Amici state that no party or its counsel has authored this brief in 
whole or in part, nor has any person or entity other than amici 
and their counsel made any monetary contribution to its 
preparation.  Letters of consent by the parties to the filing of this 
Brief have been lodged with the Clerk of this Court.  Sup. Ct. R. 
37.6.   
  
 
  
review Respondent’s statutory retroactivity claim on habeas 
corpus. Amici curiae are professors of legal history at law schools 
and universities in the United States and England with expertise in 
English legal history prior to 1789 and/or early American legal 
history.  The professional interest of amici curiae legal historians 
is in ensuring that the Court is fully and accurately informed 
respecting the historical precedent, understandings and evidence 
regarding the scope and availability of the writ of habeas corpus 
that, under this Court’s precedents, are properly considered in 
evaluating the issues raised under the Suspension Clause.  U.S. 
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2.  The people whose lives and writings amici 
curiae study, including the generation which drafted this country’s 
Constitution, considered habeas corpus a great bulwark of 
personal freedom, and unquestionably the Framers, educated in 
English law, drew on their common law comprehension when they 
prohibited suspension of the writ.  Amici curiae have no personal, 
financial, or other professional interest, and take no position, 
respecting the other issues raised in the case at bar. 
 
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Respondent Enrico St. Cyr asserts that he is in custody and 
subject to deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”) based on the agency’s misinterpretation of its 
organic statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101 et. seq.  Mr. St. Cyr contends that Congress, in amending the 
immigration statutes in 1996 to eliminate certain forms of 
discretionary relief from deportation, did not intend the 
amendments retroactively to render him ineligible for relief based 
on conduct or convictions that predated the 1996 laws.  The 
administrative courts rejected Mr. St. Cyr’s statutory interpretation 
and refused to consider his application for relief.  In his petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus, Mr. St. Cyr asked that a U.S. district court 
judge adjudicate his statutory retroactivity claim and determine the 
lawfulness of his custody by the Executive branch. 
 
The INS responds that no judge may consider Mr. St. 
  
 
  
20 
Cyr’s statutory claim, on habeas petition or otherwise.  In her 
opening brief, the Acting Solicitor General argues that the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”) requires, and the Constitution permits, the conclusion 
that no court can review the agency interpretation of the relevant 
provision, even if, as Mr. St. Cyr claims, that interpretation is 
incorrect and therefore results in Respondent’s unlawful detention 
and deportation.  
 
The Acting Solicitor General maintains that this 
conclusion is consistent with the Suspension Clause because “non-
constitutional” claims such Mr. St. Cyr’s statutory retroactivity 
claim are “well removed” from the “core of the Great Writ.”  
(Brief for Petitioner at 27, 28.)  The government in its brief 
reviews late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
challenges to deportation orders and discerns “four kinds of 
challenges” that are concededly subject to judicial review: (1) 
where the person detained was a citizen, not an alien; (2) for an 
alien deprived of a “fundamentally fair administrative proceeding”; 
(3) where the factual finding of deportability was “completely 
without supporting evidence”; and (4) where the case did not fall 
within any statutory category for deportation.  Id. at 30. 
 
The historical evidence set forth below shows, however, 
that whenever a deprivation of liberty was predicated upon 
determination of a question of law, that determination was 
reviewable on habeas.  Amici curiae are unaware of evidence that 
either the English common law or early American habeas practice 
recognized the sort of parsing of legal claims urged by the 
government here.  Rather, the historical evidence indicates that the 
statutory interpretation claim raised by Respondent falls within the 
scope of habeas corpus at common law. 
 
1. The writ of habeas corpus was available to 
persons subject to civil detention in a wide range of contexts in 
England prior to 1789.  The INS may be analogized to eighteenth 
century executive agencies such as the British Navy, 
administrative bodies such as the Sewer Commissioners, or courts 
  
 
  
21 
of “inferior” (limited) jurisdiction.  As both case law and 
commentaries confirm, unlawful detention by any such bodies 
could be corrected upon issuance of habeas corpus.  The Great 
Writ was available to non-enemy aliens and citizens alike.  Habeas 
was commonly granted where a detention was grounded on an 
error of law, including an error of statutory interpretation. Habeas 
was never fettered by any requirement that the error go to the 
jurisdiction of the decision-maker who decided to detain petitioner.  
Moreover, any distinction between constitutional and non-
constitutional errors was unknown to English law and habeas 
corpus in the English courts. Legislative efforts to reform habeas  
procedure in England in the late seventeenth to early nineteenth 
centuries also uniformly assumed the broad availability of the writ 
to correct errors of law that resulted in civil detention by the 
government.  
 
2. Similarly, early American courts commonly 
utilized habeas to resolve disputes of law, including disputes of 
statutory construction, raised by petitioners detained civilly.  
American common law also extended such remedies to non-
citizens.  Early American jurists who interpreted statutes on habeas 
challenges to civil confinement included John Marshall, Joseph 
Story, and Lemuel Shaw.  Further, while the distinction between 
constitutional and non-constitutional errors of law does have 
meaning in the American historical context, it does not appear to 
have ever been used to confine to constitutional errors the scope of 
habeas corpus in cases of civil, Executive branch detention. 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I.  
AT COMMON LAW IN ENGLAND, HABEAS CORPUS 
WAS AVAILABLE GENERALLY TO REVIEW THE 
LEGALITY OF CIVIL CONFINEMENT, WITHOUT 
LIMITATION AS TO CITIZENSHIP OR THE NATURE 
OF THE ILLEGALITY ASSERTED 
 
Case Law and Commentaries Demonstrate the 
General Availability of the Writ to Challenge 
the Legality of Civil Confinement 
 
1. By the Eighteenth Century, Habeas 
Corpus Was Established as a General 
Remedy for Unlawful Detention, 
Whether Civil or Criminal 
 
The writ of habeas corpus originated as a judicial 
development in the common law and Chancery courts of 
England.2  It was known to the common law as early as the 
fifteenth century, and was used to test the validity of 
executive committals in numerous sixteenth century cases.3  
                                                 
2
 As noted below (see infra, I.B), aspects of habeas corpus 
practice, particularly in criminal cases, were affected by 
seventeenth-century and later legislation.  The broader common 
law writ, however, lived outside statute, and had earlier origins. 
3
 See R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 6-8 (2d ed. 
1989); ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF 
PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 
THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT (2d ed. 1876) (reprint, Da 
Capo Press, 1972); 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 104-25 (2d ed. 1938) (Methuen & Co., Sweet & Maxwell, 
1966 reprint); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 129-38 (1st ed. 1765-1769) (facsimile 
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The functions of the early writ were varied and included 
relief from detention that, in modern terms, was civil in 
nature.  Any person contending that he or she was unlawfully 
detained or confined could petition for habeas corpus.  The 
petition could also be filed by the legal custodian of the 
person confined.  The recipient of the writ (the alleged 
confiner) was then required to file a return stating the legal 
basis for the detention.  The broad scope of habeas corpus 
was widely recognized; as Chief Justice Coke observed in his 
INSTITUTES, the writ extended to all detention “contra legem 
terrae,” i.e., against the laws of the land, whether civil or 
criminal, 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 54 (1642 ed.) 
(William S. Hein Co. 1986).  Blackstone described habeas 
corpus as the “the bulwark of the British Constitution,” 4 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 438, and stated that the writ 
was “efficacious . . . in all manner of illegal confinement,” 3 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES at 131. 
 
2. Eighteenth Century Courts Granted the 
Writ to Review the Legality of 
Detention in a Wide Range of Civil 
Contexts 
 
Habeas Corpus as a Remedy Against Impressment 
 
Judges used habeas corpus on numerous occasions to 
redress the unlawful impressment of sailors into the British 
Navy.  See, e.g., R. v. White, 20 Howell’s State Trials 1376, 
1377 (K.B. 1746) (King’s Bench discharging a seaman upon 
determining he was statutorily exempt from impressment); 
Goldswain’s Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 711 (C.P. 1778) (writ used 
                                                                                                    
reprint, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979). 
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to challenge a sailor’s impressment); Ex parte Drydon, 101 
Eng. Rep. 235, 236 (K.B. 1793) (Kenyon, C.J.) (holding the 
naval recruitment statute was subject to an exception, and 
therefore discharging the sailor).  Habeas review of 
impressment cases enabled not only review of the state’s 
compliance with statutory enlistment rules but also review of 
executive decisions.  Ex parte Boggin, 104 Eng. Rep. 484, 
484 n.(a) (K.B. 1811) (reference to Chalacombe's Case--
habeas issued on behalf of impressed master of a coal vessel, 
despite opposition by counsel for Admiralty on grounds that 
exemptions for "seafaring men of this description" were 
given only by "grace and favour," not "of right"). 
 
Habeas Corpus as a Remedy Against Civil Detention 
by Executive Bodies and Inferior Courts 
The Great Writ was used to review actions by inferior 
courts of record, as well as commissions and tribunals which 
affected the liberty of the subject.  Thus, actions by the 
London Court of Sessions,4 the bankruptcy commissioners,5 
the College of Physicians in its malpractice jurisdiction over 
doctors,6 the decisions of justices of the peace7 and of the 
                                                 
4
 See Bushell’s Case, 69 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1016 (C.P. 1670) 
(habeas corpus granted to discharge a juror who had been 
committed for contempt by London Court of Sessions for voting 
to acquit). 
5
 Hollingshead’s Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K.B. 1702) (prisoner 
discharged; bankruptcy commission had failed to adhere to 
statute); R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. 97, 914 (K.B. 1724 [reported 
1730]), (habeas applied to a commitment by bankruptcy 
commissioners). 
6
 Dr. Groenvelt’s Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 1038 (K.B. 1702) (holding 
that statute empowering College of Physicians to fine did not 
abrogate royal pardon power). 
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Sewers Commission sitting as a court of record8 were all 
reviewable upon the return of habeas corpus. 
 
                                                                                                    
7
 Gardener’s Case, 78 Eng. Rep. 1048 (K.B. 1600) (review of 
question of whether justice of the peace properly interpreted 
firearms statute). 
8
 Hetley v. Boyer, 79 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1613) (discharging 
individual imprisoned for refusing to release a suit to challenge 
taxation system used by the Commission to finance project; 
holding such taxation system to be invalid). 
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This inherent and wide-ranging supervisory 
jurisdiction can properly be analogized to the very kind of 
review sought in the present case, i.e., review by an Article 
III court over the activities of Article I specialized tribunals, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals and Immigration Judges.  
“Under the common law definition, both immigration judges 
and the BIA qualify as inferior courts because their 
jurisdiction is specialized and limited.  In certain respects, 
immigration tribunals are like the King’s conciliar courts, the 
extensive power of which the common law courts sought to 
supervise through habeas corpus.”  Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note: 
The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 
1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2538 (1998) 
(footnote omitted). 
 
Habeas Corpus as a Remedy in Slavery Cases 
 
The writ of habeas corpus supplied the jurisdictional 
basis for the landmark emancipation case, Somerset v. 
Stewart, 20 Howell’s State Trials 1, 79-82 (K.B. 1772).  
There, a writ was issued to bring up the body of James 
Somerset, an African slave who had been purchased by 
defendant Charles Stewart in Virginia.  Somerset was 
confined on board a ship lying in English waters, about to 
depart for Jamaica.  The Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, ruled 
that the only question was “whether the cause of detention 
upon the return was sufficient,” and since there was no 
authority under English law to force a slave out of the 
country, “the black must be discharged.” James Oldham, New 
Light on Mansfield and Slavery, 27 JOUR. OF BRITISH 
STUDIES 45, 56-58 (1988) (quoting from the Hill 
manuscript). 
 
Habeas corpus also won a discharge in February 
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1771 for another slave, Thomas Lewis, who otherwise would 
have been sent off by his master to Jamaica to be sold.  See 
R. v. Stapylton, transcribed at 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE 
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH 
LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1225-28 (1992); see also 
id. at 1242 (discussion).  During the Lewis case, Lord 
Mansfield also noted that he had granted writs of habeas 
corpus preventing the impressment of slaves in two or three 
cases on the basis of affidavits of their masters.  PRINCE 
HOARE, MEMOIRS OF GRANVILLE SHARP 59 (1820). 
 
Habeas Corpus as a Remedy Against Other Forms of 
Non-criminal Confinement 
Judges provided relief from private civil detention in 
a diverse range of cases on habeas petitions.  One common 
type involved family disputes.  In R. v. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. 
913 (K.B. 1763), a habeas writ supported by affidavits from 
parents produced an inquiry into the state of their daughter, 
who had been apprenticed at age fifteen to a music master, 
but who had been handed over to defendant to become his 
mistress.  Lord Mansfield approved this use of the writ and 
mentioned three other cases “of writs of habeas corpus 
directed to private persons, ‘To bring up infants.’” Id. at 914.  
In R. v. Turlington, 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1761), the writ 
was issued to the keeper of a private “mad-house” to bring 
into court a woman who had been placed in the asylum by 
her husband.  (The court first ordered that a medical 
examination of the woman be conducted, and on receiving an 
affidavit from the examining doctor that the woman appeared 
perfectly sane, the writ was ordered.  The woman appeared in 
court, though no return to the writ was made.)  See also R. v. 
Lee, 83 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B. 1676) (reviewing husband’s 
detention of wife, but refusing relief); Lister’s Case, 88 Eng. 
Rep. 17, 17 (K.B. 1721) (reviewing detention, releasing wife 
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whose husband “[took] her violently into his custody”). 
 
3. The Scope of Habeas Review in the 
Eighteenth Century Encompassed 
Questions of Law, Including Questions 
of Statutory Interpretation 
 
As Chief Justice Coke stated, habeas review was 
generally available to provide relief against detention 
contrary to the laws of the land.  Questions of statutory 
interpretation, along with questions of common law, were 
properly and frequently addressed on habeas.  A common 
use of habeas was in connection with the bankruptcy statutes.  
In R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep.914 (K.B. 1724 [reported 1730]), 
for example, the bankruptcy commissioners concluded that 
defendant, on his examination under oath, “had notoriously 
prevaricated.”  They had committed him to the Fleet Prison 
without bail until they had resolved his estate or until he “be 
otherwise delivered by due course of law.”  Id.  On a habeas 
petition, the court ruled, per curiam, that the statute required 
questions be put to the bankrupt in writing and that he be given 
time to consider his answer, adding: “It is very dangerous to let 
people depart from the words of the Act.”  Id.  Since the 
commitment did not conform to the words of the statute, defendant 
was discharged. 
 
Common law judges in eighteenth-century England 
disagreed about the extent to which the truth of facts asserted in a 
return of a writ could be examined by the court in a habeas hearing 
without being put before a jury.  This was one of the issues debated 
by Parliament on the unsuccessful 1758 habeas corpus bill and 
dealt with in the 1816 Act.  (See infra, pp 12-15).  Because the 
legal merits of Respondent’s statutory interpretation claim in the 
present case can be determined on the basis of undisputed facts -- 
in eighteenth century terms, on the face of the return -- that 
difference of views is not pertinent to the case at bar. 
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The common law courts were careful, however, to 
preserve and examine the legal merits of a habeas petition, even if 
this required procedural maneuvering to enable relevant statutory 
interpretation to become reviewable.  For example, in a King's 
Bench impressment case in June 1777, the court considered how to 
take up the merits of the habeas petitioner’s claim that he was 
statutorily exempt.  Lord Mansfield observed that, “this writ is an 
antient and constitutional writ; it must go in its original form, 
without bending to particular purposes,” but after discussion:  
 
At last, Lord Mansfield, with great respect to the 
gentlemen of the bar, proposed to them this 
question, “Whether any harm could result from 
this mode, if adopted, viz.  For the Crown Lawyers 
to return the writ of Habeas Corpus, that 
Mellichip, being a liveryman serving upon the 
river Thames, had been impressed into his 
Majesty’s service, having no legal exemption.”  
This, his Lordship said, would give the gentleman 
on the other side an opportunity of suggesting, that 
he had an exemption, such as the charter of the 
City, constant, invariable, immemorial usage, or 
whatever plea might be alleged.  This being 
entered on the record, might lead to a compleat 
investigation of the whole matter in view.  To 
which proposal all parties seemed to acquiesce. 
 
MORNING CHRONICLE, June 18, 1777, quoted in 1 MANSFIELD 
MANUSCRIPTS, 78. 
 
4. At Common Law, the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Ran Throughout the 
Sovereign's Territory and Applied to 
All Persons Present Therein, Including 
Aliens 
The writ applied to all non-enemy aliens detained 
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within the realm.  Such treatment is consonant with a central 
precept of English justice, that the sovereign's writs run 
throughout the realm and apply to all persons physically 
present therein.  Thus, all aliens within the realm were treated 
as entitled to its benefits, and subject to its burdens.  This is 
clearly demonstrated by the slave cases discussed above 
(Somerset v. Stewart, R. v. Stapylton, p. 7, supra).  See also 
Case of The Hottentot Venus, 104 Eng. Rep. 344, 344 (K.B. 
1810) (entertaining a habeas petition of a “female native of 
South Africa” allegedly held in private custody); R. v. 
Schiever, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1759) (reviewing, but 
denying, the habeas petition of a neutral alien deemed a 
prisoner of war because he was captured aboard an enemy 
French privateer). 
 
In Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608) (a seminal 
case dealing with issues of citizenship and alienage -- though 
not a habeas case) Chief Justice Coke explained why aliens 
are equally subject to the prerogative writs, and equally 
entitled to their benefits. “[W]hen an alien . . . cometh into 
England, because as long as he is within England, he is 
within the King's protection; therefore so long as he is here, 
he oweth unto the King a local obedience or ligeance, for that 
the one (as has been said) draweth the other.”  Id. at 383.9 
 
The common law of England therefore affords no 
support to any suggestion that the scope of the Great Writ is 
in any way conditioned by the nationality of the detainee.  
Providing the critical element of physical presence was 
established, habeas corpus could be sought on behalf of (and, 
                                                 
9
 That habeas corpus had not been specifically used to review 
immigration matters as of 1789 reflects the fact that England did 
not by statute limit admission of aliens until 1793.   
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indeed, against) any person, regardless of citizenship.  
 
The Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century History 
of Habeas Corpus Legislation in England 
Reflects a General Understanding That Civil 
Habeas Was Available to Review Executive 
Detention at Common Law 
 
As shown above, habeas corpus was developed by 
fifteenth and sixteenth century common law courts as a 
remedy against unlawful detention.  Although a common law 
creation, constitutional crises led to its reaffirmation in the 
Petition of Right and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640.10  
Subsequent legislation built on these foundations with largely 
procedural reforms.  
 
1. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 
 
                                                 
10
 For the full early history, see the sources cited at n.3, supra. 
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By 1679, the principle that the writ was available at 
common law and under the 1640 Act to challenge the legality 
of detention in a wide range of contexts, civil and criminal, 
was well established.  But problems and controversies had 
arisen, particularly in criminal cases, regarding the 
appropriate procedures to be used and which specific courts 
had power to grant the writ.  Unlike its predecessors, the 
1679 Act did not codify general principles of habeas 
practice, but instead addressed specific practical issues 
pertaining to the availability of the writ in cases of criminal 
confinement (e.g., the availability of the writ during court 
“vacation” time). 
 
2. The Habeas Corpus Bill of 175811 
 
In 1758, a bill was proposed to extend the procedural 
reforms of the 1679 Act to non-criminal cases.  It passed the 
House of Commons but eventually failed in the face of 
opposition in the House of Lords.  But two premises emerge 
clearly from the debate surrounding the bill.  First, it was not 
seriously questioned that habeas corpus was already, as a 
matter of common law, generally available in cases of civil 
detention.  Second, there was general agreement that, at least 
with respect to executive detention, the scope of review on 
habeas corpus in civil cases already was and clearly should 
remain at least as extensive as in criminal cases, including 
review of questions of law.  The central issues in controversy 
in 1758 were whether, given the broad scope of civil habeas 
                                                 
11
 See generally, Barbara W. Kern, The English High Judiciary & 
the Politics of the Habeas Corpus Bill of 1758, in HENDRIK 
HARTOG, WILLIAM E. NELSON, & BARBARA W. KERN, (eds.) 
LAW AS CULTURE & CULTURE AS LAW 147 (2000).  Amici are 
grateful to Ms. Kern for extending to us her research materials. 
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at common law, reforms were necessary in the civil context, 
whether the specific reforms proposed would render habeas 
too readily available in cases of private detention, and 
whether procedural steps were needed to ensure the 
availability of habeas during times when the common law 
courts were not sitting, i.e., during “vacation time” instead of 
“term time.”12. 
 
                                                 
12
 The central common law courts sat only four times a year for 
about two to three weeks at a time.  The dates for the terms 
varied from year to year according to the calculation of religious 
holidays, see generally C.R. CHENEY (ed.), HANDBOOK OF 
DATES FOR STUDENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY (1978), but 
customarily the year began in November with Michaelmas Term 
(after the “long vacation”), followed by Hilary 
(January/February), Easter (April/May) and Trinity (June/July). 
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The bill captured public attention, as shown by “An 
Account of the Origin and Use of the Writ of HABEAS 
CORPUS, and of the Bill now in Parliament concerning it,” 
printed in several London newspapers in late May 1758 (e.g. 
Lloyd’s Evening Post, The London Chronicle, Payne’s 
Universal Chronicle), when the bill had passed the Commons 
and was before the House of Lords.  The bill was reportedly 
prompted by a recent impressment act, specifically by 
reported abuses of impressment officers in disregarding 
statutory exemptions.  The absurdity of saying that habeas 
corpus was available to those accused of crime but not 
available to those unsuspected of any crime was remarked in 
the newspapers, but was said to be a “doubt . . . raised by 
some Lawyer.”  Yet there was, in fact, no serious question 
that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 did not apply to men 
confined under impressment acts (who had been accused of 
no crime), but rather that their remedy lay with the writ of 
habeas corpus at common law. 
 
The purpose of the 1758 bill was, thus, not to secure 
the availability of habeas in civil cases; civil habeas had long 
been firmly established.  Rather, the bill had been put 
forward by Charles Pratt, M.P., later Lord Chancellor 
Camden, in response to the plight of an unnamed gentleman 
who had been improperly impressed (since, as a 
gentleman/property holder, he was exempt by statute from 
impressment), but for whom, for procedural reasons, habeas 
corpus had not been effective.  As detailed above, habeas 
petitions were available to challenge the impressment of 
persons who were statutorily exempt (supra, p. 5), but 
habeas procedures in civil cases were at times insufficiently 
expeditious to prevent a falsely impressed man languishing in 
prison for some time pending judicial action, or, in some 
cases, from being enlisted and transported from the 
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jurisdiction before the writ became returnable.13 
 
                                                 
13
 These procedural difficulties were discussed in the newspapers 
of the day.  See, e.g., LONDON CHRONICLE, March 18-21, 1758; 
LONDON EVENING POST, April 28 - May 2, 1758. 
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Pratt’s bill swept through the House of Commons 
with barely a murmur.  It was highly popular, and its eventual 
defeat in the Lords met with indignant public reaction, one 
commentator calling it a blow to one of the two fundamentals 
of English liberty (the other fundamental being trial by 
jury).14  The opposition in the Lords was led by Lords 
Mansfield (recently-appointed Chief Justice of the Court of 
King’s Bench) and Hardwicke (recently resigned as Lord 
Chancellor after nearly twenty years in that office).  In their 
deliberations, the Lords resolved to put ten questions to the 
twelve common law judges in order to better understand the 
need for, and the implications of, the bill.  Answers given by 
nine of the twelve judges are printed in Parliamentary 
History; the views of the other three, including Mansfield, 
can be reconstructed from other sources.15  It is not necessary 
here to recount all of the difficulties that Mansfield, 
Hardwicke and others had with the bill, except to note one 
concern--that the bill would make it harder to obtain the writ 
in some civil matters, particularly family disputes, than had 
been true in practice.16 
                                                 
14
 See, e.g., THE MONITOR OR BRITISH FREEHOLDER, July 1, 1758 
(“Every friend of liberty must shudder”; “usurpation upon the 
rights and liberty of the people”; “without [the bill] the personal 
liberty of the subject may be left to the discretion of a 
passionate, corrupt, or indiscreet judge”). 
15
 Sir Michael Foster and Thomas Parker (Chief Baron of the Court 
of Exchequer) corresponded with Chief Justice Wilmot of the 
Common Pleas, as reproduced in M. DODSON, THE LIFE OF SIR 
MICHAEL FOSTER, KNT. (1811).  Mansfield’s answers were 
never printed, but his notes on the questions and about the bill 
generally are among surviving manuscripts at the family home in 
Perthshire, Scone Palace. 
16
 This would have been due to, among other things, the 
requirement in the bill that actual confinement be alleged, which 
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could not be done in the case of a wife or child who had 
willingly gone off to live with another person.  Hardwicke’s 
unpublished views can be found at Add. MSS 35,878, f. 91 et 
seq.  Mansfield’s unpublished notes are at Scone Palace MSS, 
Bundle 1352. 
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3. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1816 
 
At the end of the debate in the House of Lords in 
1758, Hardwicke moved that the judges should prepare a bill 
“to extend the power of granting writs of Habeas Corpus” to 
cases not within the 1679 Act, and to present the bill at the 
start of the next session of Parliament.17  This was agreed, 
and according to Horace Walpole, the maneuver prevented a 
division in the Lords.18  The bill was in fact drafted, but was 
never introduced.19 
 
In 1816, however, an act was passed (56 Geo. III, c. 
100) that was virtually identical to the judges’ bill.  The 1816 Act 
applied to non-criminal situations other than imprisonment for debt 
or by process in a civil suit, and provided, among other things, that 
the writ could issue during vacation on a probable cause showing 
by affidavit, and that the truth of the facts alleged in the return 
could be examined by a single judge in vacation or by the court in 
term time.  
II.  
IN COLONIAL AND EARLY POST-COLONIAL 
AMERICAN LAW, HABEAS CORPUS WAS  
GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO REVIEW THE  
LEGALITY OF CIVIL CONFINEMENT, WITHOUT  
LIMITATION AS TO CITIZENSHIP OR THE  
                                                 
17
 15 PARL. HIST. ENG. 925-25. 
18
 Id. at 925, n.*. 
19
 The bill is printed in DODSON, supra.  In a letter of March 9, 
1759, Hardwicke reported to Newcastle that he “understood the 
judges had made a draft,” but that, after a little noise about it 
some time back, he had heard nothing further.  He concluded 
that “it did not look as if the friends of the bill were eager for it.”  
Add. MSS 32,888, f. 436. 
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NATURE OF THE ILLEGALITY ASSERTED 
 
In colonial and post-colonial America, the lawfulness of 
Executive Branch confinement was subject to review on petition 
for writ of habeas corpus.  In adjudicating habeas petitions, state 
and federal judges performed the core judicial function of 
interpreting statutes and resolving other questions of law.  Judges 
recognized that the writ was available to contest the legality of 
civil confinement, and further that it was available regardless of 
the petitioner’s citizenship status.  Consistent with the 
contemporaneous practice in England described above (supra, 
I.A), American judges adjudicated habeas challenges to non-
criminal confinement by persons in military custody, held as a 
debtor, bonded servant, or slave, and detained as a deserter from a 
foreign ship. 
 
As is explained below, the broad scope extended by 
American courts to habeas corpus was affirmed in countless 
decisions, including opinions by John Marshall, Joseph Story, and 
Lemuel Shaw.  Had Mr. St. Cyr filed a petition for habeas corpus 
in 1789 contending that his Executive Branch custody was 
pursuant to the government’s misinterpretation of a statute, there is 
substantial evidence that a judge would have decided the merits of 
the statutory claim. 
 
A. Habeas Corpus As Known In England Was 
Fully A Part of Early American Law 
 
From the establishment of the American colonies, 
habeas corpus was a part of colonial law.  See WILLIAM F. 
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 98 
(1980) (conquest of “infidel” (non-Christian) lands such as 
American colonies resulted in extension of the law of 
England in force at time of conquest, including common law 
and all affirming statutory law, insofar as “was applicable to 
colonial life”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 156 (1851) 
(observing that in each colonial charter, “either expressly or 
by necessary implication it is provided that the laws of 
England so far as applicable shall be in force there”); HURD, 
supra at 92 (“The American colonists always claimed to 
possess ‘all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and 
natural-born subjects within the realm of England’”) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, “the common-law writ of habeas corpus was 
in operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled 
in 1776.”  DUKER, supra, at 115.  As detailed in Part I, supra, 
that common-law writ was available to review legal 
challenges to civil custody.20 
 
There are few reported habeas decisions from the 
colonial period.  This was true because of the paucity of 
printed case reports, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 102-03, 322-26 (2d ed. 1985), 
and because “incarceration was not routinely imposed as a 
                                                 
20
 While the common law right to habeas corpus applied with full 
effect from the establishment of each colony, the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1679 did not initially extend there, so its procedural 
innovations were at first unavailable.  DUKER, supra, at 99 (post-
conquest enactments by Parliament applied in colonies only by 
express direction).  Eventually, however, royal governors in 
Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia issued 
proclamations extending the 1679 Act’s procedural reforms in 
those colonies.  See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 
- 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 251 (1965); see also A.H. 
Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the American Colonies, 8 AM. 
HIST. REV. 18, 24-25 (1902); DUKER, supra, at 100, 103-06.  
Official extension of the 1679 Act was likely but a formality, for 
as Zechariah Chafee surmised, “in actual practice all judges used 
its procedure as a matter of course.”  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The 
Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. 
REV. 143, 146 (1952). 
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means of postconviction punishment for criminal acts until 
the nineteenth century,” Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the 
Banquet:  Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995).  The habeas 
decisions that do exist from the colonial era, however, 
confirm the writ’s role as the principal recourse of persons 
subject to illegal government detention, including non-
criminal custody.  HURD, supra, at 96-97; DUKER, supra, at 
101-02. 
 
B. In the Post-Colonial Era, Habeas Corpus Was 
As Broad and Effective a Remedy As in 
England 
 
Judges widely understood the writ to be available to 
review the lawfulness of non-criminal confinement in early 
America, including statutory questions.  See WILLIAM S. 
CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 137 
(2d ed. 1893); (“[T]he writ . . . may issue in civil as well as in 
criminal cases . . . .”); id. at 249 (“The issue raised on the 
hearing of a habeas corpus may be one of law simply.”); 
HURD, supra, at 146.21  
 
Chief Justice John Marshall and Associate Justice 
Joseph Story, riding circuit, each authored important 
decisions resolving statutory construction questions on 
habeas petitions challenging civil confinement, Marshall in a 
                                                 
21
 It is also plain that the writ was available to non-citizens.  See, 
e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, 
and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 989 (1998) 
(“The right to the writ . . . in the United States was . . . not 
limited to citizens.”); U.S. v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377, 378-79 
(Cir. Ct. D. Pa. 1797) (on habeas, discharging non-citizen 
arrested for treason). 
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debtor case, see In re Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (Cir. Ct. D. 
Va. 1833) (Marshall, C.J., on circuit), Story in a military 
enlistment case, see U.S. v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946, 949-
52 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1816) (Story, J., on circuit) (interpreting 
naval enlistment statute), and again in a case involving 
deserters from a foreign ship, see Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. 
Cas. 853, 854 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J., on circuit) 
(construing federal statute governing naval desertion).  See 
also C'wealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227 (Mass. 
1836) (Shaw, C.J.) (on habeas, construing provision of 
federal enlistment statute). 
 
1. The Founders Enshrined Habeas 
Corpus in its Full Width and Effect 
 
The Articles of Confederation were silent as to 
habeas corpus, Chafee, supra, at 145, and “when the 
constitutional convention met in Philadelphia in 1787 there 
were [only] four states with habeas corpus guarantees in their 
constitutions.”  Oaks, supra, at 247.  But see Chafee, supra, 
at 146 (absence of habeas provisions in state constitutions 
because writ “had been so long and solidly established in 
every colony that assertion was probably considered 
unnecessary”). 
 
Yet the authors of the U.S. and state constitutions 
were careful to preserve the writ of habeas corpus and to 
ensure that early U.S. practice continued English and colonial 
traditions.  At the Constitutional Convention, Charles 
Pinckney of South Carolina proposed several versions of a 
guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus, and apart from 
objection by some that the writ should never be suspended, 
the Suspension Clause was adopted with little debate.  HURD, 
supra, at 107-10; Oaks, supra, at 248-49 (noting that three 
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colonies voted against the provision that writ may be 
suspended “when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it”); DUKER, supra, at 127-35.  
 
Statutory enactments followed the adoption of habeas 
corpus clauses in the federal and state constitutions.  
Congress provided for habeas corpus jurisdiction in section 
14 of the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 
(1789), which codified the familiar common law writ.  The 
common law of each original state also provided for habeas 
review.  The states moved slowly to adopt formal statutory 
provisions, Oaks, supra, at 251, and initially all patterned 
their statutes on the 1679 English Act.  Id. at 252-53.  See 
also HURD, supra, at 121-28.  Like the 1679 Act, the statutes 
in five states initially neglected non-criminal confinement, 
leaving civil custody subject to challenge under the 
traditional common law writ.  Oaks, supra. at 254-55. 
 
2. Post-Colonial Case Law Evidences 
The Wide and General Application of 
Habeas Corpus To Review Questions 
of Law 
Reflecting eighteenth century English practice, the writ of 
habeas corpus was invoked to challenge the lawfulness of non-
criminal confinement in a number of circumstances in the post-
colonial period.  In their decisions, state and federal judges 
regularly performed the traditional function of construing statutes 
and resolving other questions of law. 
a. Habeas as a Remedy for Indentured Servants 
 
Habeas was used to challenge private confinement as 
an indentured servant, and in these cases judges regularly 
adjudicated statutory claims.  See, e.g., Respublica v. 
Keppele, 2 U.S. 197, 198-99 (Mem.) (Pa. 1793) (construing 
Pennsylvania servant statute, concluding infant could not be 
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bound, and discharging fourteen year-old who had fled 
service); State v. Sheve, 1 N.J.L. (1 Coxe) 230, 230 (N.J. 
1794) (granting writ to 27-year old man indentured by 
mother, upon application of common-law principle that 
“parental authority to dispose of a child’s services ceases 
when the latter arrives at the age of twenty-one”); State v. 
Taylor, 3 N.J.L. (2 Penning.) 467, 1808 WL 1006, at *1 (N.J. 
1808) (Pennington, J., dissenting) (minor must agree to 
indenture himself under “the true construction” of state 
servitude statute); C'wealth ex rel. Stephenson v. Vanlear, 1 
Serg. & Rawle 248, 1815 WL 1221, at *2-3 (Pa. 1814) 
(opinion of Tilghman, C.J.) (construing 1799 statute, in part 
in contrast to 1790 statute, and holding master’s assignment 
of indentured minor to third-party, without consent of 
minor’s father, improper under later statute); In re 
Goodenough, 19 Wis. 274 (1865) (holding indenture in 
violation of state statute requiring that instrument specify 
instruction in “profession, trade, or employment”).  Church 
gives the specific example that where states regulate such 
relationships, “[i]ndentures of apprenticeship must conform 
to the requirements of the statute,” CHURCH, supra, at 744, 
and are subject to review on habeas.  Id. at 745. 
 
Judges also adjudicated a related legal claim on 
habeas, that a master had unlawfully removed a servant from 
the state in which the indenture had been executed.  See, e.g., 
C'wealth v. Edwards, 6 Binn. 202 (Pa. 1813) (applying 
common law to hold minor bound in Virginia may not be 
removed to Pennsylvania, where indenture does not provide 
for such removal).  See also Davis v. Coburn, 8 Mass. 299, 
1811 WL 1678, at *4 (Mass. 1811) (if master could assign 
servant from New Hampshire “into Massachusetts, I see not 
why he might not have sent him to Georgia, or even to 
China.  That a master should have such legal authority would 
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be monstrous”) (emphasis in original); Gusty v. Diggs, 11 F. 
Cas. 128 (Cr. Ct. D.C. 1820) (apprentice bound in Maryland 
may not be brought into District of Columbia). 
 
b. Habeas As Applied in Civil Debtor Cases 
 
Debtors subject to confinement also petitioned for 
writs of habeas corpus in the United States, and these 
petitions frequently raised questions of law.22  The opinions 
                                                 
22
 See, e.g., Kennedy & Co. v. Fairman, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 408 
(N.C. 1796) (construing creditor notice provision of insolvency 
statute and remanding prisoner); Fitzpatrick v. Neal, 3 N.C. (2 
Hayw.) 8 (N.C. 1797) (debtor arrested and imprisoned pursuant 
to letter of attorney released because letter not under required 
seal); Shorthouse & Ross v. Carothers, 3 Yeates 182 (Pa. 1801) 
(releasing debtor who had been re-arrested after posting bond in 
same cause); Ex Parte McNeil, 6 Mass. 245 (Mass. 1810) 
(discharging debtor as privileged from arrest while attending 
court in the “necessary care of his action”); C'wealth v. 
Cornman, 4 Binn. 483 (Pa. 1812) (construing provisional 
discharge section of 1812 insolvency statute and remanding 
prisoner); C'wealth v. Alexander, 6 Binn. 176 (Pa. 1813) (on 
habeas, releasing debtor on grounds that warrant was defective); 
Attorney Gen. v. Fenton, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 292 (Va. 1816) 
(affirming discharge of men confined by court-martial, for 
failure to pay fine for not appearing at place of rendezvous for 
militia); C'wealth v. Keeper of Jail, 4 Serg. & Rawle 505 (Pa. 
1818) (construing 1802 federal statute prohibiting arrest of 
soldier for debt and denying writ to detained husband who 
deserted family and failed to provide maintenance); Bank of U.S. 
v. Jenkins, 18 Johns. 305, 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) (affirming 
authority under state habeas statute to review lawfulness of 
debtor’s imprisonment); Richards v. Goodson, 4 Va. (2 Va. 
Cas.) 381 (Va. 1823) (holding debtor privileged from arrest 
while attending court on his own case and discharging prisoner); 
C'wealth v. Waite, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 445 (Mass. 1824) (where 
debtor arrested upon valid execution, incorrect copy produced in 
return to writ, and correct copy provided later, terms of state 
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in In re Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (Cir. Ct. D. Va. 1833), 
show that judges resolved questions of statutory construction 
in habeas challenges to civil confinement of debtors.  There, 
on a warrant issued by the Treasury under a statute governing 
the administration of public accounts, see 3 Stat. 592, 31 
U.S.C. §§ 506-508, Randolph was arrested for debt allegedly 
outstanding following his naval service.  Randolph, 20 F. 
Cas. at 242.   On habeas, Chief Justice Marshall recited but 
avoided several constitutional challenges raised by 
Randolph’s counsel, notably that the act impermissibly 
conferred judicial power on the executive.  Id. at 253-54 
(Marshall, C.J., on circuit).  He then conducted a detailed 
statutory analysis, comparing the text of §§ 2 and 3 of the act, 
before construing the sections narrowly as not applying to 
Randolph, an “acting” Purser.  Id. at 254-57; see also id. at 256 
(describing “fair construction” of act); id. at 251-52 (Barbour, D.J., 
on circuit) (construing act as not permitting Treasury to reopen 
account previously settled).23  
 
c. Habeas To Redress Unlawful Military 
Enlistment 
                                                                                                    
statute satisfied).  See also Discharge of Richardson, Worcester 
Sup. Jud. Ct., (Mass. Sept. 1800) (discharging debtors who, as 
soldiers, were exempt from imprisonment for debt under federal 
statute), cited in William E. Nelson, The American Revolution 
and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Federalism and 
Conflict of Laws, 62 COLONIAL SOC. OF MASS. 419, 458 n.7 
(1984); Oaks, supra, at 265. 
23
 Judge Barbour also considered “whether habeas corpus could be 
sustained in favor of a party imprisoned under civil process,” id. 
at 253, in light of Marshall’s cryptic decision in Ex Parte 
Watson, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 52 (1810).  Barbour reviewed the 
common law authorities, however, and concluded that “the writ 
is not confined to criminal cases.”  Randolph, 20 F. Cas at 253.  
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Nineteenth century American courts decided many 
habeas petitions challenging the legality of military and 
naval enlistments, routinely exercising a broad scope of 
review.  NELSON, supra, at 457 (“State writs of habeas 
corpus . . . were used on numerous occasions to test the 
validity of military enlistments . . . Such state writs, of 
course, carried with them the power to interpret the federal 
statutes by which the validity of the enlistments was 
determined”).  See generally HURD, supra, at 156. 
Many habeas challenges to military enlistments arose 
around the time of the War of 1812.  In an effort to expand 
the nation’s military forces, the federal government paid 
bounties to enlistment brokers for each new recruit secured, 
leading to a high number of fraudulent enlistments, often of 
minors.  Arkin, supra, at 14-15.  See, e.g., C'wealth v. 
Murray, 4 Binn. 487, 487, 492-93 (Pa. 1812) (opinion of 
Tilghman, C.J.) (interpreting 1809 statute as permitting naval 
enlistment of minor child who “has neither father, master, nor 
guardian” and “against the consent” of mother, relying in part 
on comparison between 1802 army and 1809 naval 
enlistment statutes); Ex parte Mason, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 336, 
337 (N.C. 1809) (construing statutory term “parent” as 
including mothers as well as fathers); C'wealth v. Cushing, 
11 Mass. (11 Tyng) 67, 71 (Mass. 1814) (“The true 
construction must be, that persons under the age of twenty-
one years are not to be enlisted or held in service, unless with 
the [required] consent . . . and if they have no parents, 
guardians, or masters, they are not to be enlisted or held in 
service at all”) (emphasis added); C'wealth ex rel. Menges v. 
Camac, 1 Serg. & Rawle 87, 1814 WL 1344, at *2 (Pa. 1814) 
(opinion of Tilghman, C.J.) (construing statute as permitting 
father to consent days after minor’s formal enlistment).24 
                                                 
24
 See also In re Stacy, 10 Johns 328, 333-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) 
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(Kent, C.J.) (discharging civilian accused of treason and 
detained by federal military authorities as beyond authority of 
tribunal). 
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The differing interpretations of the parental consent 
provisions reached by the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts 
courts were addressed in a major opinion by Justice Story on 
circuit.  United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (Cir. Ct. 
D. Mass. 1816), exemplified statutory construction in a 
habeas corpus case.  Bainbridge was a challenge to a minor’s 
enlistment in the U.S. Navy without parental consent.  After 
concluding that Congress could constitutionally authorize the 
enlistment of a minor without parental consent, Justice Story 
turned to the specific question of whether Congress actually 
had so legislated.  Reviewing the language of the naval and 
army enlistment acts, and reading the instant statute against 
general common-law contract principles, Justice Story 
concluded that the naval acts allowed the enlistment of a 
minor without his father’s consent.  Id. at 951-52.25 
                                                 
25
 Habeas challenges to military enlistments led judges to continue 
to construe the statutes after the War of 1812.  See, e.g., State v. 
Brearly, 5 N.J.L. 555, 1819 WL 1256, at *5 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1819) 
(consent by master subsequent to enlistment of apprenticed 
minor sufficient under statute); State v. Clark, 2 Del. Cas. 578, 
580-81 (Del. Ch. 1820) (discharging soldier on evidence that he 
was underage and intoxicated at time of enlistment, “knew 
nothing of being enlisted until the next morning,” and lacked his 
father’s consent, as confinement was “contrary to law”); In re 
Carlton, 7 Cow. 471, 471, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1827) (“Any person 
illegally detained, has the right to be discharged, and it is the 
duty of this court to restore him to his liberty.”); C'wealth v. 
Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227, 1836 WL 2527, **3-4 (Mass. 
1836) (Shaw, C.J.) (distinguishing Bainbridge and holding 
statute does not authorize minor enlisting as seaman in the U.S. 
Navy without consent of his legal guardian); Bamfield v. Abbot, 
2 F. Cas. 577, 578 (D. Mass. 1847) (discharging minor allegedly 
enlisted under 1846 act, where company had “not [yet] been 
mustered into the service of the United States, or been received 
or accepted by any officer thereof”); C'wealth ex rel. Webster v. 
Fox, 7 Pa. 336, 1847 WL 5030, at *2 (Pa. 1847) (prohibition in 
the 1802 Act against enlistment of minors without consent of 
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father, guardian, or master “is as plain as the English language 
can make it”); Sim’s Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285, 309 (1851) 
(issuance of writs “is constantly done, in cases of soldiers and 
sailors, held by military and naval officers, under enlistments 
complained of as illegal and void”);  U.S. ex rel. Turner v. 
Wright, 28 F. Cas. 798, 798-99 (Cir. Ct. W.D. Pa. 1862) 
(construing statute as requiring discharge of minor who enlisted 
on false oath); U.S. v. Taylor, 28 F. Cas. 22, 22-23 (D.N.J. 1863) 
(statutory language and legislative history indicate that oath of 
enlistment taken by the recruit is conclusive as to his age); In re 
McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 33, 34-36 (D. Mass. 1866) (engaging in 
“[a] careful examination of the acts of congress regulating 
enlistments in the army” to determine whether, inter alia, 
enlistment of minor without father’s consent was valid). 
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Habeas review of legal questions in the enlistment 
cases was plainly available to non-citizens.  See, e.g., 
C'wealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 63, 65 (Mass. 1814) 
(discharging Russian minor enlisted without consent of 
parent, guardian, or master, as “[a] foreign minor is included 
in the [statutory] prohibition”); Wilson v. Izard, 30 F. Cas. 
131, 1815 U.S. App. Lexis 247, at *2 (C.C. D. N.Y. 1815) 
(adjudicating claim by British enlistees that they were “alien 
enemies” ineligible to serve but remanding); U.S. v. Wyngall, 
5 Hill 16, 18, 26, 1843 WL 4481, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) 
(construing statutory authorization to enlist “able bodied 
citizen[s] of the United States” as directory, not mandatory 
and concluding that non-citizen was lawfully enlisted). 
 
d. Habeas Relief For Deserters From Foreign 
Ships 
 
Seamen who deserted from foreign ships, regardless 
of citizenship, were subject to arrest, either at the request of 
consular officers pursuant to treaty or under general federal 
legislation enacted in 1829.  See Neuman, supra, at 990-91.  
These arrests occasionally prompted habeas petitions to state 
and federal judges, whose decisions resolved questions of 
law.  See, e.g., C'wealth v. Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle 392 
(Pa. 1815) (discharging alleged deserter and holding arrest 
not authorized by statute or common law); Case of the 
Deserters from the British Frigate L’Africaine, 3 Am. L.J. 
132 (reporting 1809 Maryland decision discharging alleged 
deserters); Case of Hippolyte Dumas, 2 Am. L.J. 86 
(reporting 1807 Pennsylvania decision discharging alleged 
deserters); Ex parte Pool, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 276 (1821) 
(arrest of deserters by justice of peace exceeded his 
authority); In re Pederson, 19 F. Cas. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) 
(construing treaty as inapplicable to Swedish deserter who 
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returned home and was later arrested after emigrating to 
U.S.); see also U.S. v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 49 
(Mem) (1795) (where district court declined request of 
French consul to arrest alleged deserter, Attorney General 
sought mandamus from Supreme Court, arguing if arrest was 
unlawful prisoner could seek release on habeas corpus);U.S. 
v. Desfontes & Gaillard (S.D. Ga. 1830) (on habeas petition 
by French Consul to deliver alleged French deserters, holding 
sailors properly detained on state criminal charges and 
remanding to state custody), reprinted in Eric M. Freedman, 
Milestones in Habeas 
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 Corpus: Part I, 57 ALA. L. REV. 531, 598-99 (2000).  
 
In 1813, Portugese sailors arrested as alleged deserters 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, requiring 
Justice Story, on circuit, to interpret provisions of a federal statute.  
Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1813) 
(Story, J., on circuit) (construing Act of July 20, 1790, 1 Stat. 131, 
regulating seamen in merchant service).  The court, per Story, was 
“of the opinion, that the act for the regulation of seamen 
exclusively applies to seamen engaged in the merchants’ service of 
the United States.”  Id. at 854.  Because the Portugese sailors were 
engaged by a foreign vessel, Story held their confinement was 
authorized by neither statute nor treaty.  Id. 
 
e. Habeas as a Remedy Against Other Forms of 
Civil Confinement 
 
Legal questions arose on habeas challenges to non-
criminal confinement in several other circumstances.  A 
number of decisions addressed challenges to confinement by 
a justice of the peace or lower court, often resulting in 
delineation of the scope of the confining entity’s legal 
authority.  See, e.g., C'wealth v. Ward, 4 Mass. (Tyng) 497, 
497 (1808) (“[t]he justice [of the peace] has wholly 
misconceived his authority” and “the commitment was 
illegal”); C'wealth v. Morey, 8 Mass. (Tyng) 78 (Mass. 1811) 
(same); Hite v. Fitz-Randolph, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 269 (1812) 
(on habeas, discharging creditor who had been arrested on 
contempt order for trying to collect on judgment subject to 
stay, on grounds that “county court [had] no right to make an 
order restraining [creditor] from proceeding on his judgment 
at law obtained in the superior court of law”); C'wealth ex 
rel. Kerr v. Brady, 3 Serg. & Rawle 309 (Pa. 1817) (on 
habeas, holding probate court lacked authority to confine 
relator on contempt and discharging prisoner); Washburn v. 
Belknap, 3 Conn. 502 (1821) (confinement to workhouse for 
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indefinite term by justice of peace contrary to statute); State 
v. Applegate, 13 S.C.L. (McCord) 110 (1822) (justice of 
peace not authorized to confine constable for act of contempt 
done outside presence of justice); Ex parte Minor, 17 F. 
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Cas. 457 (Cir. Ct. D.C. 1823) (on habeas, discharging debtor 
as arrest warrant exceeded authority of justice of peace).  See 
also McMullen v. Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (Bay) 46 (S.C. 1787) 
(arrest for selling certain liquor by municipal “court of 
wardens” unauthorized by statute permitting municipality to 
regulate liquor). 
 
In some instances, slaves sought writs of habeas 
corpus to win their freedom.  See, gen. Arkin, supra, at 33-
41; see also Respublica v. Betsey, 1 U.S. 469 (Mem.) (Pa. 
1789) (construing Pennsylvania statute governing abolition 
of slavery as requiring discharge where owner failed to 
register slave by statutory deadline); State v. Emmons, 2 
N.J.L. 6 (1806) (applying 1798 state statute governing 
freeing of slaves and holding execution of manumission did 
not satisfy statutory requirements); State v. Quick, 2 N.J.L. 
393 (1807) (applying New York statute and granting slave’s 
petition for freedom); C'wealth ex rel. Lewis v. Holloway, 6 
Binn. 213 (Pa. 1814) (construing exception for slaves of 
members of Congress to state statute governing abolition of 
slavery and remanding); Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 
493, 496 (Cir. Ct. D. S.C. 1823) (Johnson, J. on circuit) 
(declaring local Negro Seaman Act unconstitutional, but 
holding federal habeas statute did not reach person in state 
custody).  
 
Finally, as in England, persons confined in mental 
health institutions occasionally petitioned for release on 
habeas.  See Oakes, 8 Monthly Law Reporter 122 (Sup. Jud. 
Ct. Mass. 1845) (not officially reported), excerpted in Oaks, 
supra, at 267. 
 
In short, the history of colonial and early post-
colonial habeas practice demonstrates a strong continuity 
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with English traditions set forth in Part I, supra.  At common 
law and pursuant to state and federal statutory enactments, 
the writ was plainly available to persons held in non-criminal 
confinement as a means to challenge the lawfulness of their 
custody.  The writ was available to non-citizens.  And, most 
importantly for the instant case, the rich history of early civil 
habeas practice confirms that state and federal judges 
regularly decided questions of law, including interpretation 
of statutes governing military enlistment, confinement of 
debtors, indentured servitude, abolition of slavery and 
desertion from foreign ships.  These decisions provide 
significant support for the proposition that statutory claims, 
such as the statutory retroactivity claim asserted by 
Respondent Enrico St. Cyr, were subject to review on the 
writ of habeas corpus familiar to the Founders. 
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